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Software Security

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Security basics - CIA

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability

- Traceability

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Security basics

- Nothing is 100% secure

- Time is limited – for developer
- Time is unlimited – for intruder

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
Problem

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

Where is the problem introduced?

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- ### Where does security come in?
- OWASP, Open Web Application Security Project
 - CLASP, Comprehensive Lightweight Application Security Process
 - 7 best practices
 - Microsoft
 - SDL, Security Development Lifecycle
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- ### CLASP 1 Awareness Program
- Education for all (not only developers)
 - Project leaders need to understand security
 - Testers need to understand security
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- ### What to do
- Choose the best from the models
 - Define roles
 - Security coach
 - Security assessor
 - Continuous, iterative security approach
 - Risk analysis
 - Security guidelines and rules
 - Education
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
Design principles



- Defence in depth
- Least privilege
- Separation of duties
- Separation of privilege
- Escalation of privilege
- Separation of data and functionality

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Defence in depth



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Programming



Two kinds of problems:

1. Input
2. Other problems

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Buffer overrun



Buffer overrun

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Buffer overrun



- Typical problem
- Easy to create...
- Common in low level languages, C och C++
- Can be present in other layers of code

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Explanation



- Mix of data and program code
- Typical in a stack
 - Contains info about function calls:
 - Return address
 - Local variables

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Example




```
void func(char* input)
{
  char buf[16];
  strcpy(buf, input);
  ...
}
```

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Stack at call of "func"



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Problem



- If more than 16 characters are input, the pointers will be changed

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How to use



- Change the pointer to somewhere in your own code (e.g. in "buf")
- Let the code start a new process
- Easy!

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Alternative



- Use functions with given length, (`strncpy`).

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Problem



- Counting is difficult
- Do you start with 0 or 1?
 - Should the first and last value be included?
 - How many bytes do you need for the string "example" ? (Answer: 8, the string ends with \0)

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Exercise – what is wrong?



```
void process_string(char* scr)
{
    char dest[32];
    for (i=0; src[i]&&(i<=sizeof(dest));
        i++)
        dest[i] = scr[i];
    ...
}
```

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Tips



- Tänk på första och sista tecknet

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Exercise – what is wrong?



```
void get_user(char* user)
{
    char buf[1024];
    if (strlen(user) > sizeof(buf))
        die("error: user string too
            long\n");
    strcpy(buf, user);
    ...
}
```

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Tips



- Prova med 1024 tecken

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
How do you use this?

Only one byte ...

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Testing



- Code review:
 - Input checks
 - Use of input data
 - Use of dangerous constructions
 - Arithmetics in the calculation of buffer sizes

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Controls



- Place a "stack cookie" between the variables and pointers in the stack
- Random number, generated at run-time
 - If it is changed, the stack is corrupt

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Controls, 2



Pointers are coded

e.g. XOR with a secret cookie

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Test of Buffer Overflow



Survey:

- Check input
- Check data flow from input to internal data structures
- Check for insecure string functions
- Check counting (string length, buffer sizes etc.)

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Test of Buffer Overflow, cont.



- Semi-random testing, fuzzyttesting
- Increase input length gradually
- Check sizes close to probable limits
- .

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Integer Overflow



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Explanation



- Binary arithmetic
- Type casting is sometimes not intuitive and potentially dangerous
- Note: this can happen in old code that is reused

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Binary arithmetics



Ex: 1 byte

0001 1011 = 27

Values from 0 to 255

What is the result of 255 + 1 ?

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Negative numbers



Leftmost bit is sign

Ex: 1111 1111 is -1

1111 1110 is -2

1111 1011 is -5

Values from -128 to 127

What is -128 - 1?

What is 127 + 1?

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Types of Integers



| Type | Size | min | Max | |
|--------------------|--------|-----------------|---------------|----------|
| signed char | 1 byte | -128 | 127 | (0x7f) |
| unsigned char | 1 byte | 0 | 255 | (0xff) |
| short | 2 byte | -32 768 | 32 767 | (0x7fff) |
| unsigned short | 2 byte | 0 | 65 535 | (0xffff) |
| int | 4 byte | - 2 147 483 648 | 2 147 483 647 | |
| unsigned int | 4 byte | 0 | 4 294 967 295 | |
| long | 4 byte | - 2 147 483 648 | 2 147 483 647 | |
| unsigned long | 4 byte | 0 | 4 294 967 295 | |
| long long | 8 byte | ... | ... | |
| unsigned long long | 8 byte | 0 | ... | |

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Overflow



```
unsigned int a;
a = 0xe0000020;
a = a + 0x20000020;
```

Gives 0x100000040 does not fit in an int, gets truncated to 0x00000040

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Underflow



```
unsigned int a;
a = 0;
a = a - 1;
```

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Problems?



- Unexpected casting
- Unexpected overflow, underflow

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Example



```
const long MAX = 0x7fff;
short len = strlen(input);
if ( len < MAX)
  ...
```

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But...



```
const long MAX = 0x7fff;
short len = strlen(input);
if ( len < MAX)
  ...
strlen gets casted from unsigned int to
signed short
0x00000100 -> 0x0100
0x0000f000 -> 0xf000 (negative...)
```

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Example, cont.



```
const long MAX = 0x7fff;
short len = strlen(input);
if ( len < MAX)
  ...
len is converted to long before comparison
0x0100 blir 0x00000100
0xf000 blir 0xfffff000 (negativt)
```

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Typecasting



- Typecasting is a potential problem
- Is performed at calculations, comparison
- All numbers must be the same type
- The rules are not obvious and has been changed...

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Example 2, checking for overflow



```
bool AddOk (unsigned short x,
            unsigned short y)
{
  if ( x + y < x)
    return false;
  return true;
}
```

This should work. If $x+y$ is less than x then $x+y$ has overflowed, giving a result less than x

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Problem:



```
bool AddOk (unsigned short x,
           unsigned short y);
{
    if ( x + y < x)
        return false;
    return true;
}
```

But, before the addition unsigned short is typecast to int (4 byte)

Before comparing, short is typecast to int.
Thus, it can never be greater than $x + y$

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Summary



- Type casting
 - long, short, signed, unsigned...
- Addition, subtraction
- Multiplication, division, modulo (rest)
- Binary operations can also give surprising results

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Consequence



- Security problem, for instance when accessing memory in lower layers of code
- One of the largest problems today

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How to find



- Check input
- Look out for type casting

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Countermeasures



- Control of input data
- Data validation, range-check
- Use unsigned, if possible
- Avoid smart solutions!

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Test



Survey:

- Check all arithmetic (can be a lot)
 - Check where data comes from input
 - Check array-index
 - Check type casting
- Check limits
 - 8bit: 127, 128, 255, 256
 - 16bit: 32767, 32768, 64K-1, 64K
 - 32 bit: 2G-1, 2G, 4G-1, 4G

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SQL Injection



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Description



- Change the meaning of an SQL-statement by giving incorrect input
- string- concatenation is often used

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Exemple



```

"read Id from the user"
string sql = "SELECT cardno FROM" +
  "cust WHERE id = " + Id;
"print his cardnumber, cardno "

```

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Problem



Try with `Id = 1 or 2>1 --` , gives the searchcriteria

`id = 1 or 2>1 --`

Always true. Produces alla cardnumbers...

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How to find



- What is under the control of an intruder? (Id in the example)
- Is input data controlled?
- Look out for possible string concatenation in SQL-statements

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Countermeasures



- Input control

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Test



- Kartläggning:
 - Icke validerad input tillsammans med strängkonkatenering och SQL-anrop.
 - Även LDAP / XML injections / XPath injections
- Test:
 - Kodgranskning bästa sättet.
 - Input med tecken som ' (slut på data)
; (slut på sql-sats)
reserverade ord i SQL (+LDAP/XML/XPATH...)

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Cross Site Scripting



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Cross Site Scripting



- Web based systems
- Input control missing
- Common

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Description



- A web application returns input data without checking if it might be something nasty, i.e. a script

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XSS, example



Let someone's browser execute e.g.

```
<script>document.write('</a><script>alert(document.cookie);<script>'`
  - Persistenta kan vara mer svårfunna

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## Compiler optimization



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## Description



- A compiler translates into machine code with the semantics unchanged
- Gives the possibility of optimization. This is often positive
- But, it might remove code that is only for security

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## Example



- Sensitive data is stored in memory
- The memory area is explicitly overwritten after use
- The compiler optimizes away the rewriting, the area is not in use any more...

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## Example, cont.



```
void getPassword(void) {
 char pwd[64];
 if (GetPassword(pwd, sizeof(pwd))) {
 /* checking of password, secure
 operations, etc */
 }
 memset(pwd, 0, sizeof(pwd));
}
```

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## Explanation



- `memset(pwd, 0, sizeof(pwd));` is taken away, there is no more call to `pwd`,
- The sensitive information is left, open to a later attack

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## How to find?



- Very difficult
- You need to know how the compiler works

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## Even worse



- Some optimizations are included in some versions only of compilers.
- This can be changed by time

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## Countermeasures?



- Turn the optimization off
- Choose the correct level of optimization

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## Cont.



- Turn the optimization off for sensitive parts

```
#pragma optimize("", off)
 memset(pwd, 0, sizeof(pwd));
#pragma optimize("", on)
```

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## Example 2



```
char *buf;
int len;
len = 1<<30;
[...]
```

if(buf+len < buf) /\* kolla om  
overflow \*/  
[...overflow...]

- Ref: US-CERT **Vulnerability Note VU#162289**, 2008-04-04

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## Explanation



- Overflow is a non defined state in the standard. A compiler can choose how to handle this. An optimization candidate!
- From gcc ver 4.2 this is taken away
- From gcc ver 4.2.4 this is optional (use `-fno-strict-overflow`)

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## Countermeasures?






- Code review
- Input control

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## Input control



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### Explicit validation

```

if InputValidated;
{
 continue
}
error

if InputNotOK;
{
 error
}
continue

```

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### Validate with regular expressions

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### In many programming languages, e.g.

| uttryck | betydelse                  |
|---------|----------------------------|
| ^       | start av sträng            |
| \$      | slut av sträng             |
| *       | 0 eller flera upprepningar |
| +       | 1 eller flera upprepningar |
| {n,m}   | Mellan n och m uppr.       |
| a b     | a eller b                  |
| [abc]   | någon av a,b eller c       |
| [a-z]   | ingår i a till z           |
| \       | escape char                |
| etc.    |                            |

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## Example



```
^[a-z]+\.(jpg|gif)$
```

semesterbild.jpg

is an example of a string in this

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## Example 2



```
RegExp r = ^[a-z]{1,8}\.[a-z]{1,3}$;
if (r.Match(strFileName).Success) {
 ...
}
else {
 ...
}
```

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## Programming rules



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## CERT, Top 10 Secure Coding Practices



- <https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/seccode/Top+10+Secure+Coding+Practices>

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## Tio i topp



1. Validate input.
2. Heed compiler warnings.
3. Architecture and design for security policies.
4. Keep it simple.
5. Default deny.

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## Tio i topp, forts



6. Adhere to the principle of least privilege.
7. Sanitize data sent to other systems.
8. Practice defense in depth.
9. Use effective quality assurance techniques.
10. Adopt a secure coding standard.

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Bonus



1. Define security requirements
2. Model threats.

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