

A Coordination-based Methodology for Security Protocol Verification

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Abstract. The quest for the formal certification of properties of systems is one of the most challenging research issues in the field of formal methods. It requires the development of formal models together with effective verification techniques. In this paper, we describe a formal methodology for verifying security protocols based on ideas borrowed from the analysis of *open* systems, where applications interact with one another by dynamically sharing common resources and services in a not fully trusted environment. The methodology is supported by ASPASyA, a tool based on symbolic model checking techniques.

1 Introduction

Software applications are evolving towards *open* architectures. The key aspect in this shift is the relevance that interaction and dynamics have assumed in the life of applications. An open system is characterised by being composed of autonomous interacting components, whose configuration may dynamically vary in time. Moreover, the system architecture may be only partially accessible, both because of its dynamics and because it may be distributed over different, non-controllable domains. Hence, interacting components have to coordinate their behaviour according to the dynamic supply and demand of resources. This scenario fosters the creation of an environment of *services*, offered on the net and accessed on demand by a phase of dynamical binding (preceded by complementary publishing and discovering phases). The standard example is provided by the *Web Services* technology [16].

The advantages of an *architectural design of components and services* have been investigated from several different perspectives, as, for instance, the dynamic coordination of active components, understood as “*the process of building programs by gluing together active pieces*” [11], or the theory about “*the structure of the components of a program/system, their interrelationships, and principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution over time*” [18]. However, despite the many advances obtained, lifting traditional techniques to the case of services integration in open systems presents a set of recognised difficulties, which impose an upgrade of the goals and techniques that must be developed for a mature architectural design, [30, 3]. For instance, extra information must

be formalised by the component abstractions, like the assumptions which they are based on and the conditions under which they can be dynamically integrated/binded into a system. Moreover, these dynamic systems need affordable verification techniques to express the properties of interest.

Here, we present a specification and verification methodology tailored for security protocols. The methodology has been inspired by the more general context outlined above. It basically considers a protocol as an open system where *principals* (e.g., components), may dynamically join and coordinate themselves in multiple running session of the protocol, where a malicious component, hereafter called *intruder*, may “interfere” with the execution of the protocol. The methodology consists of four steps: 1) Specification of the behaviour of the principals and the desired property, 2) specification of the conditions on intended sharing of secrets, 3) specification of the power of the intruder, in terms of its initial knowledge, 4) automatic verification of whether the protocol executions, as they have been formalised, do or do not satisfy the property. We have observed that the results of step 4) can be fruitfully exploited to iterate steps 2), 3), and 4), according to the insights gained in the previous iterations about the actual, and often unexpected, behaviour of the protocol. Also, step 2) has impact on dynamic connections and communications.

The methodology relies on a formal framework introduced in [9, 35]. This consists of a calculus for the formal description of principals enhanced with linguistic mechanisms for dynamic bindings, and an *ad-hoc* logic to express the security properties to be checked. The logic predicates over data exchanged in the protocol and observed by an intruder in the execution environment, and also over the “presumed” identities of the principals.

The methodology is supported by a verification environment, called $\mathcal{ASPASyA}$ (Automatic Security Protocol Analysis via a SYmbolic model checking Approach). In the model checking approach, the system behaviour is described in terms of a transition system, while properties that must be verified are represented as logic formulae. The possible models for a formula are represented by a subset of states, for instance those corresponding to terminating computations. If the formula “exhaustively” holds in all the significant states, verification is successful, otherwise a counter example is produced. Among the advantages of model checking we remind efficiency (e.g., optimized data structures, like BDDs), and the possibility of being completely automated, [14]. In our case, symbolic techniques have been adopted to overcome some intrinsic sources of incompleteness. Namely, during state space generation, constraints on the possible values of principals’ variables are collected, then $\mathcal{ASPASyA}$ checks whether an assignment for the variables, such that the formula is satisfied, does or does not exist. The overall methodology and $\mathcal{ASPASyA}$ are quite human-interactive, both because of the high degree of expertise required by the problem and its formalisation, and to allow the verification process to be guided towards the properties of interest. Once the protocol and its properties are tuned by the user, the automatic verification phase starts. Our framework naturally allows varying the intruder’s knowledge, the portion of the state space to be explored, and the specification

of implicit assumptions that are very frequent in security. The user can opportunely mix those three ingredients for checking the correctness of the protocol without modifying neither the protocol specification nor the specification of the desired properties.

Section 2 and Section 3 review security protocols, and the formal framework, respectively, to put the reader in context. The verification methodology is illustrated in Section 4. A comparison with similar approaches in literature is reported in Section 5. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.

2 Security Protocols: An Overview

Security protocols are intended to control relevant information in a scenario where some principals communicate through a “public channel”. Relevant information has a very broad sense, subsuming confidentiality, non-modifiability or authenticity. On the other hand, the channel is public: It is not possible to avoid that the exchanged messages are accessed, manipulated or destroyed by an intruder.

In general, the formal certification of security protocols requires a careful definition of the underlying assumptions upon which the protocol relies, of the security property it is supposed to enforce, and also of the hypotheses on the capabilities of the intruder. In the following, we briefly review security protocols, referring to [32, 23] for a more comprehensive introduction.

Cryptography. A message m is a *plaintext* when the information it contains can be obtained directly from m , while a message n is a *cryptogram* when the information is “hidden” in it. Given a *cryptographic key* k , the message m is *encrypted* in the cryptogram $n = \{m\}_k$ and the original information can be retrieved only by means of the knowledge of the key k . We adopt the standard working assumption of *perfect encryption*: A cryptogram can be *decrypted* only using its decryption key, i.e. secrets cannot be guessed, no matter how much information is possessed. In symmetric cryptography, the same key k is used for encryption and decryption, while in asymmetric cryptography one key, called *public key*, is used for encryption, and a complementary *private key*, is used for decryption. Any principal can encrypt a message for another principal by means of its public key. The latter is the only one that can decrypt the message with its private key.

Hereafter, we denote the intruder by I , principals by A, B, \dots , A^- and A^+ are the private and public keys of a principal A , λ^- is the complementary key of λ (i.e. A^+ if $\lambda = A^-$, A^- if $\lambda = A^+$, and k if $\lambda = k$ is a symmetric key), and m, n is the pair of messages m and n . For the sake of presentation, we assume that keys have no structure, i.e. they are simply names. Structured keys add a source of complexity to the analysis that can be dealt with by the same symbolic techniques illustrated in Section 3 for handling structured, and hence infinite in number, messages.

Notice that an appropriate sharing of keys, which may also be obtained dynamically, is an essential feature for the correct assignment of the roles played

by the principals in the execution of protocols. For instance, keys and their ownership may be used to attribute identity to principals.

Protocol specification. A *security protocol* may be naively thought of as a finite sequence of messages between two or more principals. There is a great variety of specification mechanisms for protocols and properties, but traditionally an informal mix of natural language and ad hoc notation is used. The next example illustrates the informal specification of a protocol as a list of communication steps.

Example 1. The Wide Mouthed Frog (WMF) protocol [10] aims at letting A send a fresh session key kab , i.e. a key to be used within a limited temporal interval, to B through a trusted server S . Both A and B share two private keys with S (kas and kbs , respectively). The informal xspecification of WMF protocol is:

$$\begin{aligned} (1) \quad & A \rightarrow S : A, \{ta, B, kab\}_{kas} \\ (2) \quad & S \rightarrow B : \{ts, A, kab\}_{kbs} \end{aligned}$$

A sends S its name and a cryptogram with the name of B , the session key kab and a “fresh” nonce ta . S sends B a cryptogram with the session key kab , the name of A , and a new nonce ts . Nonces, which are uniquely associated to a session of the protocol, “approximate” the time-stamps used in the original formulation (e.g., S would not react to two requests by A with the same nonce). This makes the presentation simpler without requiring an explicit representation of time (which, however, can be embedded in our approach). \diamond

Note that the above description is not a complete specification, since it does not specify, for instance, whether or not only B and S must know kab and ts , and who can access the exchanged messages. Moreover, in some consist the intruder exploits the information acquired by playing different roles in concurrent sessions of the protocol. Hence, a clear specification of how sessions can be interleaved, and of the security properties expected after such concurrent runs, is also necessary, as recognised for instance in [10].

Security properties. Protocols have been designed to enforce many security properties. Among them we consider here *integrity* (the intruder cannot corrupt exchanged cryptograms), *secrecy* (the intruder cannot know exchanged cryptograms), and *authentication* (the intruder cannot let a principal misunderstand the identity of its partners in the communications). Different kinds of security properties, like *fairness* and *non-repudiation*, will be addressed in future investigations.

Example 2. The WMF protocol of Example 1 is expected to enforce the secrecy of kab : In every session its value must be known only by the principals playing the roles of A , B and S . Moreover, also the authentication of A to B is desirable: In every session where B receives the message from S , A must have created kab , *in the same session*, and asked S to forward it to B . \diamond

Intruder model. We adopt the (widely accepted) Dolev-Yao intruder model [17]: The intruder is a principal that can interfere with all the communications, e.g. by hiding, reading and modifying messages, with the only limit of the perfect encryption hypothesis. The intruder can have some private data, and can store data exchanged in previous runs of a protocol. It can be characterised in terms of its acquired knowledge and formalised as an execution environment that collects all the sent messages, manipulates and sends them to the principals waiting for some input.

Let N be a countable set of names, containing nonces and principal names and K a set of symmetric and asymmetric keys. Then, within this paper, the set $M = \{m, n, \dots\}$ of messages is defined as

$$M ::= N \mid K \mid M, M \mid \{M\}_M.$$

The Dolev-Yao intruder is characterised by a set of messages κ , the *intruder knowledge*, and the messages that can be derived from it, written as $\kappa \bowtie m$, by splitting known pairs, pairing and encrypting known messages, and decrypting known cryptograms whose key is known. Decidability of \bowtie has been proved for private key cryptography in [13], and for public key cryptography in [9, 35].

Example 3. Given $\kappa = \{\{A^{-1}\}_k, \{m\}_{A^+}, k\}$, it holds $\kappa \bowtie \{m\}_k$. Indeed, from $\kappa \bowtie \{A^{-1}\}_k$ and $\kappa \bowtie k$, it follows $\kappa \bowtie A^{-1}$, which allows the decryption of $\{m\}_{A^+}$ obtaining m . Finally, from $\kappa \bowtie k$ it follows $\kappa \bowtie \{m\}_k$.

3 Formalising Security Protocols

The methodology (introduced in Section 4) relies upon two ingredients: The *cryptographic Interaction Pattern* calculus (cIP), and the *Protocol Logic* (\mathcal{PL}), introduced in [9, 35]. The calculus, allows us to formally specify the behaviour that the principals of a protocol exhibit. Distinguishably, the calculus requires to explicitly indicate how principals can be connected together, i.e. how keys can be shared by them. It consists of an instance of the IP-calculus, a process algebra introduced in [9] for describing the behavioural composition of components in open systems. The logic is used to formalise the properties that the protocol is expected to enforce. It predicates over the intruder knowledge, the way principals share keys and the data they exchange. Moreover it allows for quantification over principal instances in order to uniformly express properties about multiple-runs of protocols.

The cIP calculus. The cIP calculus is a name-passing calculus of the π -calculus family [25]. It extends the IP-calculus with cryptographic primitives, in the style of [1], and with explicit constructs for the dynamic sharing of keys.

A cIP processes $A \triangleq (\tilde{X})[E]$ stands for the principal A that is ready to share keys represented by its *open variables* \tilde{X} and behave according to its *behavioural expression* E . A behavioural expression consists of a finite sequence of input and output actions *in*(d) or *out*(d) (over a public channel, whose name is omitted). The datum d is a message where variables can appear. Open variables

are binders for the free occurrences of \tilde{X} in E ; usual scoping rules apply: Occurrences of variables in input actions are binder, and are denoted as $?x$ (we assume that output actions do not contain binders and input actions contain at most one binder of each variable). A variable can hence be instantiated either when a communication action is executed, or when the principal is *dynamically* connected to its partners in a protocol execution. Note that open variables has been introduced in [8] as a general mechanism to express the sharing of resources, e.g. communication channels, between components which are dynamically connected together. In this paper, this mechanism has been specialised to the sharing of cryptographic keys that allow principals to interact within a protocol run.

Names and variables are syntactically distinguished entities, the former are constant terms, the latter placeholders that can be substituted with terms or opportunely renamed. A principal must be closed: Variables must be bound by either input actions or open variables.

Example 4. The principals of the WMF protocol are formalised in cIP as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} A &\triangleq (x, xas)[out(A, \{ta, x, kab\}_{xas})] & B &\triangleq (zbs)[in(\{?s, ?x, ?w\}_{zbs})] \\ S &\triangleq (u, ya, v, yb)[in(u, \{?t, v, ?r\}_{ya}).out(\{ts, u, r\}_{yb})] \end{aligned}$$

Principal A intends to agree on a session key with a partner whose identity will be assigned to its open variable x when A will join a protocol run, where S and B may already be present. The open variables xas of A and ya of S , by being instantiated with the same symmetric key, allow the two principals to share a key. Similarly, yb and zbs play the same role for S and B . Finally, the server S gets the identity of A and B in u and v . \diamond

To model multiple-runs, principals may be replicated in *principal instances*, obtained by indexing all variables (open or not) and all names in E with a distinguished natural number, e.g. $A_1 \triangleq (x_1, xas_1)[out(A_1, \{ta_1, x_1, kab_1\}_{xas_1})]$. Principal instances with different indexes are distinguished, i.e. $A_1 \neq A_3$.

Instances run in a *context*, i.e. a set of running instances that may be dynamically joined by other instances, causing a further sharing of keys, as explained below. Notice that the actual sharing is determined off-line as a mapping from open variables to keys. Indeed, the verification task is not oriented to determine the “right” sharing of secrets, but in testing whether a sharing allowing for an attack does or does not exist.

Let \mathcal{C} be a (running) context, with $n - 1$ instances of principals, and $ov(\mathcal{C})$ the set of the open variables of its principals. Given $A_n \triangleq (\tilde{X}_n)[E_n]$ a principal instance, and γ a partial mapping from $ov(\mathcal{C}) \cup \tilde{X}_n$ to the set of keys, then the *join* operation is defined as:

$$join(A_n, \gamma, \mathcal{C}) = (\tilde{X}_n - dom(\gamma))[E_n\gamma] \cup \bigcup_{(\tilde{Y})[E'] \in \mathcal{C}} (\tilde{Y} - dom(\gamma))[E'\gamma].$$

It returns the new context joined by the principal instance, according to the mapping. Open variables must be assigned to symmetric or asymmetric keys according to their usage (that is explicit in the syntax of the principal). Once assigned, they are no longer open. Note that after a join operation the context may remain open, i.e. it may contain open variables for later join operations.

$$\begin{array}{c}
\frac{\kappa \bowtie m : \exists \gamma \text{ ground s.t. } d\gamma \sim m}{\langle (\tilde{X}_i)[in(d).E_i] \cup \mathcal{C}, \chi, \kappa \rangle \mapsto \langle (\tilde{X}_i)[E_i\gamma] \cup \mathcal{C}, \chi\gamma, \kappa \rangle} \textit{(in)} \\
\frac{}{\langle (\tilde{X}_i)[out(m).E_i] \cup \mathcal{C}, \chi, \kappa \rangle \mapsto \langle (\tilde{X}_i)[E_i'] \cup \mathcal{C}, \chi, \kappa \cup m \rangle} \textit{(out)} \\
\frac{\mathcal{C}' = \textit{join}(A_i, \gamma, \mathcal{C}) \quad A \triangleq (\tilde{X})[E] \quad i \textit{ new}}{\langle \mathcal{C}, \chi, \kappa \rangle \mapsto \langle \mathcal{C}', \chi\gamma, \kappa \cup \{A_i, A_i^+\} \rangle} \textit{(join)}
\end{array}$$

Fig. 1. Context reduction semantics

Semantics of contexts. The operational semantics of contexts is given in terms of the Labelled Transition System (LTS) \mapsto that relates configurations $\langle \mathcal{C}, \chi, \kappa \rangle$, where \mathcal{C} is a context, χ are the bindings due to communications and join executions, and κ is the intruder knowledge. The rules specifying \mapsto are reported in Figure 1. A principal can input a datum, if an appropriately matching \sim message m can be derived from κ , rule *(in)*. All the outputs of the principals are recorded in κ , rule *(out)*, as well as the name and the public key of every principal joining the context, rule *(join)*. The semantic model of cIP formalises the Dolev-Yao intruder model. All the communications occur throughout the intruder: It records all the exchanged messages and the names of the principal instances that join the context, and it sends messages derived from its knowledge to principals. In the simplest case it only forwards messages, allowing for the intended execution of the protocol to take place.

Example 5. A configuration of a context of the WMF protocol, joined by the principal instances A_3 , S_2 and B_1 is $\langle \{A_3, S_2, B_1\}, \emptyset, \gamma_0 \rangle$, where

$$\begin{array}{l}
A_3 \triangleq ()[out(A_3, \{ta_3, B_1, kab_3\}_k)] \\
S_2 \triangleq ()[in(A_3, \{?t_2, B_1, ?r_2\}_k).out(\{ts_2, A_3, r_2\}_k)] \\
B_1 \triangleq ()[in(\{?s_1, ?x_1, ?w_1\}_k)]
\end{array}
\quad \text{and} \quad
\gamma_0 = \begin{cases}
zbs_1, xas_3 \mapsto k \\
ya_2, yb_2 \mapsto k \\
x_3, v_2 \mapsto B_1 \\
u_2 \mapsto A_3
\end{cases}$$

Notice that, even if not intended, this context models the case in which A_3 , S_2 and B_1 share the same key k . A possible terminating trace leads to the final intruder knowledge $\kappa = \{A_3, \{ta_3, B_1, kab_3\}_k, \{ts_2, A_3, kab_3\}_k\}$, and mapping $\gamma_1 = \gamma_0^{\{ta_3, kab_3, ta_3, A_3, kab_3 / t_2, r_2, s_1, x_1, w_1\}}$, which is generated when the environment sends the cryptogram $\{ta_3, B_1, kab_3\}_k$ to B_1 (the match holds). \diamond

The cIP calculus offers the possibility of *uniformly* extending a context with new instances of principals of the protocol. What it is meant by “uniformly” is the fact that variables and names occurring in principal expressions are labelled with a unique index when instances join the context. This linguistic mechanism allows us to determine which are the instances that originated the names used through the execution of the protocol as well as to distinguish between different principals playing the same role.

Some remarks are worth to be done here.

Join is not an operator of the calculus. The way principals are connected together, namely how keys are initially shared, is typically given beforehand. Since this is determinant for the aims of protocol verification, it has been described at the semantic level, which hence formally describes the consequences of a new principal joining the running protocol. As it will be discussed in Section 4, distinguishably for our methodology, this also provides an efficient mean to control the conditions of the verification experiment, and to focus on those initial sharing of secrets which are more significant for the properties one wants to certify.

Cryptography. Encryption and decryption are embedded into communications via the notion of matching (rule *(in)*). This linguistic choice is shared with a few of other approaches, like [1, 6], which, however, adopt different verification methodologies. Input actions must declare the key with which they intend to receive and decrypt a cryptogram, and the communication can take place only if the input and output messages match, namely $\{m\}_\lambda \sim \{n\}_{\lambda^-}$, with $m \sim n$. This guarantees a correct use of keys. For instance, $\{m\}_k$ matches the input message $in(\{?x\}_k)$, since the symmetric key k decrypts the cryptogram, while $\{m\}_{k1}$ and $\{?x\}_{k2}$ would not match, with $k1 \neq k2$. After the communication, variable x is instantiated with the content m of the cryptogram $\{m\}_k$.

Symbolic analysis The semantics of cIP contains a source of incompleteness in the choice of the message m , rule *(in)*, among the infinitely many that can be derived from κ as input message for a principal (see [13] about incompleteness in protocol analysis). This leads to an infinite state space problem that we have addressed by adopting a symbolic approach; this approach consists in delaying the choice of the message and annotating the inputs variables with a finite representation of the current κ , and, hence, of all the messages that can be derived from it. We represent this, for an input variable x , by means of the *symbolic variable* $x(\kappa)$, for “ x can assume any message m such that $\kappa \times m$ ”. Symbolically matching messages can be structurally composed in terms of symbolic variables and standard messages. Future evolutions of the context, may further specify the values of $x(\kappa)$, for instance when it is used in place of a key. Symbolic variables allow the existential quantifier of rule *(in)* to be replaced by a constructive generation of a finite set of possible symbolic messages, which works similarly to unification.

Even if in general more assignments for a variable can be possible, their number is finite (and typically bound by the number of messages added so-far to the knowledge). Consider, for instance, an input message $\{?x\}_\lambda$. A matching message could be constructed either by knowing the appropriate key λ^{-1} , or by means of each suitable matching message, like $\{m\}_{\lambda^{-1}}$. Such messages may belongs to the initial knowledge or been acquired in previous communications and hence are finite in number. A symbolic trace represents all the concrete traces obtained by instantiating its symbolic variables with the messages derivable from the associated knowledges. Proving the correspondence of symbolic and concrete traces [9, 35] guarantees the correctness of the symbolic verification, which also impacts, together with other optimisations, on the effectiveness of the method.

\mathcal{PL} logic. Security properties are expressed by means of the \mathcal{PL} logic (Protocol Logic), which predicates over the messages derivable from κ , the values assumed

by variables and their relationship with the principals that generate and communicate them. In our approach, integrity is read as the possibility of fixing some values, generalising the approach introduced in [1], secrecy as the values contained or not contained in κ , and authentication through relations among principals' variables.

Let δ, σ be messages, variables, or the name of the intruder I , the formulae ψ, ϕ of \mathcal{PL} are

$$\delta \in \kappa \mid \delta = \sigma \mid \forall A.i : \phi \mid \neg \phi \mid \phi \wedge \psi,$$

where \in is read as *derivability* of the message, $=, \neg, \wedge$ are equality, negation and conjunction, and $\forall A.i : \phi$ allows for quantification over instances: i is a variable ranging over instance indexes, possibly occurring as index in ϕ .

Example 6. A property that the WMF protocol should satisfy is the secrecy of the session key kab , unless it is intended for I : $\forall A.i : x_i \neq I \rightarrow kab_i \notin \kappa$, i.e. “for every instance of A , whose partner is not I (the open variable x_i of A is for its partner name), the key generated by A_i , kab_i , can not be derived from κ ”. \diamond

Truth of formulae depends on the past computation, namely on both κ and assignments χ , hence formulae are checked against models consisting of pairs κ, γ produced by terminating traces, since those are the states of interest where the formula must hold. The notation $\kappa \models_\chi \phi$ means that κ , under the variable assignment χ , is a model of the formula ϕ . Relation \models (for closed formulae) is defined by the following deduction rules (and the omitted obvious one for \wedge):

$$\frac{x_i \chi = \delta \chi}{\kappa \models_\chi x_i = \delta} (=) \quad \frac{\kappa \bowtie \delta \chi}{\kappa \models_\chi \delta \in \kappa} (\in) \quad \frac{\kappa \not\models_\chi \phi}{\kappa \models_\chi \neg \phi} (-) \quad \frac{\kappa \models_\chi \phi\{^j/i\} \text{ for all } A_j : \kappa \bowtie A_j}{\kappa \models_\chi \forall A.i : \phi} (\forall).$$

Index quantification ranges over the finite number of instances that participated to a session, whose name is in κ (\forall). Intuitively, the use of $\not\models$ in the premise of rule $(-)$, intended as the impossibility to prove ϕ , is justified by the fact that, in each rule, formulae in the premises are always “structurally smaller” than those in the conclusions (and hence the recursive definition \models is well defined). Finally, the lifting of the logic to the case in which symbolic variables occur in formulae as effect of assignments is easy, considering symbolic variables as conditions of membership to the associated κ .

Example 7. Considering again the WMF protocol, one may wish to verify the secrecy property written in its naive form, as $\phi = \forall A.i : kab_i \notin \kappa$: “The session key generated by A is not know by the intruder”. Let us suppose that we want to let I play the role of a normal principal, namely B . In this case, it is sufficient to add a key, say ksi to κ . Let us consider the context where S shares ksi with I , and A wants to speak with I :

$$\begin{aligned} A_1 &\triangleq ()[out(A_1, \{ta_1, I, kab_1\}_{kas})] \\ S_2 &\triangleq ()[in(A_1, \{?t_2, I, ?r_2\}_k).out(\{ts_2, A_1, r_2\}_{ksi})] \end{aligned} \quad \text{where } \gamma_0 = \begin{cases} xas_1, ya_2 &\mapsto kas \\ yb_2 &\mapsto ksi \\ x_1, v_2 &\mapsto I \end{cases}$$

It is easy to verify that $\kappa_1 = \{A_1, S_2, I, ksi, \{Ta, I, kab\}_{kas}, \{Ts, A, kab\}_{ksi}\}$, and $\gamma = \{xas_1, ya_2 \mapsto kas, yb_2 \mapsto ksi, x_1, v_2 \mapsto I, t_2 \mapsto ta_1, r_2 \mapsto kab_1\}$, which are produced by a terminating trace of the context, are not a model for ϕ . The discovery of this “spurious”, but possible, attack can be easily avoided by further specifying the property in its original formulation: $\forall A.i : x_i \neq I \rightarrow kab_i \notin \kappa$. In this case the antecedent of the formula is false, and the trace is not considered as an attack. This kind of expressiveness of the logic will be helpful in focusing the verification on “intended” classes of attacks.

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4 The Verification Methodology

Our verification allows the user to directly control and manage many aspects of the verification process. The methodology consists of four steps:

1. Initially, the informal narration of the protocol is specified in cIP, and, accordingly, the security property is formalised by means of a \mathcal{PL} formula;
2. a formula specifying invariants on the connections of principals is given; such a formula, hereafter called *connection formula*, states the constraints on open variables that the join operation must satisfy so that sharing of secrets is explicitly specified;
3. the intruder knowledge is set according to the power that the verifier grants to the intruder, for instance public/private keys or messages acquired in previous run of the protocol may be added to κ ;
4. the automatic phase of the verification starts. ASPASyA is invoked and, depending on the results, steps 2 and 3 are iterated.

About step 1, the formalisation of the protocol narration cannot be automated but it requires expertise, for instance to specify open variables of cIP principals. Nevertheless, some rule of thumbs can be given:

- Initiator usually needs an open variable for connecting to the responder;
- if the identity of the partner is acquired in a communication, then no open variable should be necessary about the identity of partner (unless checks on the identity are required);
- an open variable might be necessary when a principal must interact with a server, in order to share a key (as done in ϕ_{WMS}).

Also the formalisation of security properties is a complex task that requires experience. The logic \mathcal{PL} can formalise:

- The impossibility for the intruder to know a particular datum d in a run of the protocol, when checking for secrecy properties,
- the relations between variables of different principals that must hold in every run, when more complex properties, like authentication, must be verified.

In step 2 a connection formula is specified, in order to constraint the allowed connections and the sharing of keys between principals. Consider, for instance, principals A and S of the WMF protocol as described in Example 4; if S is trusted, we might be interested in verifying only the executions of the protocol where (any instance of) A *properly* shares a *secret* key with (a corresponding instance of) S . This can be expressed by the following *connection* formula, which, intuitively, states that the intruder cannot behave as a server:

$$\phi_{WMF} \triangleq \forall A.i : \exists S.j : xas_i = ya_j \wedge xas_i \notin \kappa.$$

Connection formulae, together with the join operation, are a distinguished feature of our approach. Whenever a join operation is executed, the connection formula is checked and, if it does not hold, then the analysis of that trace is aborted. Moreover, formulae constitute a formal device that the user can exploit for pruning the state space. Indeed, by tuning the connection formula, the user can formally state assumptions that are usually implicit in the informal presentation of the protocol (e.g., the trustworthy of the server in the WMF protocol). The result of a verification session sometimes reveals that some assumptions on the protocol have not been correctly formalised. By refining the hypotheses on principal connections, false attacks can be filtered out. Basically, connection formulae can be exploited for focussing the verification on those states that are interesting to the verifier.

The join operation and the connection formulae are also a coordination mechanism for programming and modelling the interactions of processes in an open system, where components dynamically access running contexts by connecting to other participants. For instance, considering *web services*, the components are the services and new services are built by properly connecting existing components. In the current practice, this is statically done by the programmer; while the join operation and the connection formula would allow the programmers to specify the constraints over the dynamic connections of their components.

Step 3 specifies the initial knowledge of the intruder so that a protocol is checked under weaker conditions. This knowledge is mainly used for two purposes: (i) to let the intruder know some secrets (e.g. compromised keys) enhancing its attacking power, for instance to test the robustness of the protocol, and (ii) to let the intruder know something about past interactions between principals (cryptograms exchanged in previous sessions). The latter is especially useful in finding *replay attacks* where the intruder exploits messages appeared in previous session.

Steps 2, 3 and 4 can be iterated in order to tune the connection conditions, and the initial knowledge, according to the results obtained in previous iterations.

In order to explain the methodology, we apply it to the analysis of the KSL protocol [19] (a simplification of Kerberos [20]). The goal of KSL is the repeated authentication between principals A and B that exploit a trusted server S . The protocol is divided into two parts: An initial exchanging of messages which establishes a session key between principals, followed by the repeated authentication

part. Repeated authentication is performed by means of an expiring ticket generated by B for A . Until the ticket is valid (not expired), A can re-authenticate itself with B without requesting a new session key from S . The informal specification of KSL is as follows:

- | | |
|---|--|
| (1) $A \rightarrow B : na, A$ | (6) $A \rightarrow B : ma, \{Tb, A, k^{ab}\}_{k^{bb}}$ |
| (2) $B \rightarrow S : na, A, nb, B$ | (7) $B \rightarrow A : mb, \{ma\}_{k^{ab}}$ |
| (3) $S \rightarrow B : \{nb, A, k^{ab}\}_{k^{bs}}, \{na, B, k^{ab}\}_{k^{as}}$ | (8) $A \rightarrow B : \{mb\}_{k^{ab}}$ |
| (4) $B \rightarrow A : \{na, B, k^{ab}\}_{k^{as}}, \{Tb, A, k^{ab}\}_{k^{bb}}, nc, \{na\}_{k^{ab}}$ | |
| (5) $A \rightarrow B : \{nc\}_{k^{ab}}$ | |

Messages (1 \div 5) are the key exchange part whereas messages (6 \div 8) are the repeated authentication. Namely, each further interaction between A and B starts from message (6). Server S shares a symmetric key with each principal. Initiator A generates a nonce na , and sends it to B . Then B asks S for a new session key, S generates k^{ab} and, in (3), encrypts the session key in two cryptograms $\{nb, A, k^{ab}\}_{k^{bs}}$ and $\{na, B, k^{ab}\}_{k^{as}}$ sent to B . Notice that here it is implicitly assumed that k^{as} (resp. k^{bs}) is known only by S and A (resp. B). After decrypting $\{nb, A, k^{ab}\}_{k^{bs}}$, B assumes that k^{ab} is the fresh session key generated by S and meant to be shared with A (freshness of k^{ab} is enforced by nonce nb).

Message (4) is quite complex and crucial; B sends to A a message containing: (i) the cryptogram $\{na, B, k^{ab}\}_{k^{as}}$ generated by S on message (3), (ii) the “ticket” $\{Tb, A, k^{ab}\}_{k^{bb}}$, (iii) a new nonce nc and (iv) the nonce na encrypted with k^{ab} .

The ticket is a cryptogram encrypted with a key k^{bb} that only B knows and will be used in the second part of KSL for achieving repeated authentication; apart from the identity of A , it contains a *generalised time-stamp*¹ and the session key so that B can check the validity of the ticket. The nonce nc will be used to prove to B that A really asked for the session key k^{ab} , while the cryptogram $\{na\}_{k^{ab}}$ is generated to witness to A that B has acquired k^{ab} . Message (5) closes the first part of KSL: A sends back nc encrypted with k^{ab} so that B is granted that A acquired the session key.

Principal A knowing k^{ab} and the ticket issued by B can re-authenticate itself performing messages (6 \div 8). In (6), B receives a nonce, ma , and the ticket that B has previously generated for A . If the ticket is valid, B sends ma encrypted with k^{ab} to A together with a new nonce mb , used to ensure the identity of A in message (8).

The first step of our methodology prescribes to provide the cIP formalisation of each role of the protocol and the formalisation of the property of interest. We first describe the first phase of the protocol, i.e messages (1 \div 5). Later, we will describe the rest of the protocol according to a verification session. This allows us to focus on the main characteristics of the two phases and also shows how the methodology accomplishes with the intuitions behind the verification. The

¹ A generalised time-stamp reports the current time of the local clock of B , an indication of lifetime and an “epoch” identifier to protect B against replay attacks. we refer to [27] for problems related to time-stamps.

principals are

$$\begin{aligned}
S &\triangleq (a, ak, b, bk) [in(?cna, a, ?cnb, b). out(\{cnb, a, kab\}_{bk}, \{cna, b, kab\}_{ak})] \\
A &\triangleq (b, sk) [out(na, A). in(\{na, b, ?r\}_{sk}, ?tkb, ?bn, \{na\}_r). out(\{bn\}_r)] \\
B &\triangleq (sk) [in(?cn, ?u). out(cn, u, nb, B). in(\{nb, u, ?r\}_{sk}, ?tka). \\
&\quad out(tka, \{nt, u, r\}_{kbb}, nc, \{cn\}_r). in(\{nc\}_r)]
\end{aligned}$$

It is important to point out the role played by open variables. Principal S has variables a and b respectively for the identity of the initiator and the responder. The server needs two further variables, ak and bk that are meant to store the symmetric keys that S shares with A and B , respectively. Similarly, A and B use sk for storing the keys they share with S . Notice that variables are distinct in different principals.

KSL tries to achieve repeated mutual authentication; informally this means that each time B (connected to S) terminates a run of the protocol, thinking to have interacted with a A (connected to S) then A has recently executed a session with B and A actually has been the partner in the communications, and viceversa. The following \mathcal{PL} formula ψ_{KSL} formalises the authentication property of A to B for the KSL protocol:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\forall B.l : \exists S.i : \exists A.j : (b_i = B_l \wedge u_l = A_j \wedge b_j = B_l \wedge a_i = A_j) \rightarrow \\
&\quad (cna_i = na_j \wedge cnb_i = nb_l \wedge r_j = kab_i \wedge r_l = kab_i \wedge cn_l = na_j \wedge nc_l = bn_j)
\end{aligned}$$

The formula ψ_{KSL} states that any instance B_l is attached to an instance of the server template S_i ($b_i = B_l$). Moreover, if B_l is the partner of an instance A_j ($u_l = A_j$) that is connected as initiator to S_i ($a_i = A_j$) then a “correct” data exchange should take place, provided that A_j aimed at authenticating itself to B_l ($b_j = B_l$). Correctness of data exchanging holds if: (i) the server receives the correct nonces ($cnb_i = nb_l$ and $cna_i = na_j$), (ii) both B_l and A_j obtain the same session key generated by S_i ($r_j = kab_i$ and $r_l = kab_i$), finally, (iii) the nonces received by B_l are all generated by A_j ($nc_l = bn_j$ and $cn_l = na_j$).

The second step of our methodology requires to specify a connection formula ϕ_{KSL} stating that the server shares private keys with the initiator and the responder. In \mathcal{PL} this is rendered as follows:

$$\phi_{KSL} \triangleq \forall S.i : \exists A.j : (a_i = A_j \rightarrow ak_i = sk_j) \wedge \exists B.l : (b_i = B_l \rightarrow bk_i = sk_l).$$

In words, it is required that for every S_i (instance of the server) there is a connected initiator A_j such that ak_i and sk_j are assigned to the same value: S_i and A_j share the same key. This also models the correspondence between the initiator’s identity and the server’s open variable holding the shared key. (The rest of ϕ_{KSL} states the same property for the responder.) Note that ϕ_{KSL} excludes that an instance of A can act as responder. In order to allow this possibility, we can consider the following formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
\phi'_{KSL} &\triangleq \forall S.i : \exists A.j : (a_i = A_j \rightarrow ak_i = sk_j \wedge b_i = A_j \rightarrow bk_i = sk_j) \wedge \\
&\quad \exists B.l : (b_i = B_l \rightarrow bk_i = sk_l \wedge a_i = B_l \rightarrow ak_i = sk_l),
\end{aligned}$$

however, we stick to the simpler ϕ_{KSL} for our verification.

Table 1 reports the results of the verification for the first phase of KSL. We checked various scenarios by varying the number of instances and the possible

	3 Instances			4 Instances		
Join	Configurations	Time (s)	Attacks	Configurations	Time (s)	Attacks
<i>true</i>	10240	58	0	–	–	–
ϕ_{KSL}	550	12	0	13218	4:21	0
ϕ'_{KSL}	590	34	0	15723	5:07	0

Table 1. Attack report for the first phase of KSL

connection formulae. Even though no attack has been discovered in this phase, it is worth noticing how the connection formulae can help in reducing the size of the state space. For instance, in the case of three instances of principals, the number of states in a completely unconstrained setting (first row) is very large compared to the case where one of ϕ_{KSL} or ϕ'_{KSL} is used. This is even more evident when considering the case of four instances; in fact, the verification with the trivial connection formula requires a unreasonable amount of time (one day on a 2.4MHz Athlon processor), whereas both ϕ_{KSL} and ϕ'_{KSL} terminate in few minutes.

Since the first phase of the protocol does not yield any attack, we perform the verification of KSL by focussing on the second phase of the protocol, i.e., on the messages (6 ÷ 8). We consider correct the session key exchange phase, and check whether an attack can be built during the repeated authentication phase. Under this hypothesis, at the end of the 5-th message of KSL, we can safely assume that

- since the intruder is aware of the initial five messages of the session, the ticket is in the initial knowledge (among other data);
- A (resp. B) thinks that B (resp. A) is running a session protocol as responder (resp. initiator);
- A and B share a key in the current session;
- the key is valid in virtue of a certificate issued by B .

Since we are assuming that the interactions of A and B with S are trusted and not compromised, we can consider only the principals for A and B :

$$\begin{aligned}
A &\triangleq (b, sk, tk)[out(nma, \{b, A, sk\}_{tk}).in(?mb, \{nma\}_{sk}).out(\{mb\}_{sk})] \\
B &\triangleq (a, sk, tk)[in(?ma, \{B, a, sk\}_{tk}).out(nmb, \{ma\}_{sk}).in(\{nmb\}_{sk})].
\end{aligned}$$

Note that the sharing of the ticket acquired by A in the first phase is here modelled by the use of the open variable tk of A and B . Actually, A never uses tk as decryption key (i.e., in an input action) since the key encrypting the ticket is known only by B . Indeed, A only uses tk in the first output for communicating the ticket to B . The assumptions on the secrets shared by A and B , including the correct sharing of data acquired in the previous phase of the protocol, is formalised by means of the following connection formula:

$$\bar{\phi}_{KSL} = \exists B.l : \exists A.j : tk_j = tk_l \rightarrow b_j = a_l \wedge sk_j = sk_l,$$

stating that if there are two instances of A and B sharing a ticket, then they aim at communicating one another ($b_j = a_l$) and share a session key ($sk_j = sk_l$).

Join/Knowl.	2 Instances			3 Instances			4 Instances		
	Conf.	Time (s)	Attacks	Conf.	Time (s)	Attacks	Conf.	Time (s)	Attacks
$true, \kappa_0$	104	0.69	0	3878	1.53	8	–	–	–
$true, \bar{\kappa}_0$	104	0.85	0	3878	1.89	8	130870	2:27	16
$\bar{\phi}_{KSL}, \kappa_0$	71	0.64	0	3220	1.50	6	–	–	–
$\bar{\phi}_{KSL}, \bar{\kappa}_0$	71	0.80	0	3220	1.85	6	52692	1:16	12

Table 2. Attack report for KSL repeated authentication part

The authentication formula to be checked can be stated similarly to what done for ψ_{KSL} , but it is simpler than ψ_{KSL} because we can ignore the communications with the server:

$$\bar{\psi}_{KSL} \triangleq \forall B.l : \exists A.j : b_j = B_l \wedge a_l = A_j \rightarrow ma_l = nma_j \wedge mb_j = nmb_l.$$

Since the verification of KSL with two instances does not yield any attack (as reported in Table 2), we focus on the case with three participants.

In the third step we must specify the intruder’s knowledge. We have already pointed out that the intruder is aware of those messages exchanged in the first phase. Hence, the initial knowledge κ_0 contains the following messages: I, B_1, B_2, A_3 , i.e. the instances that joined the session, and $\{B_1, A_3, sk_1\}_{tk_1}$, the ticket issued by B_1 for A_3 . These messages contain variables (e.g., sk_1, tk_1, \dots) that will be instantiated during the generation of the initial contexts by means of the join operation. We can think of κ_0 as a template for a knowledge that compactly specify a set of messages depending of the join operation. In this case, ASPASyA finds (and reports) the following attack (among others):

- | | |
|---|---|
| (1) $A_3 \rightarrow I : nma_3, \{B_2, A_3, ks\}_{kb2}$ | (6) $I \rightarrow B_2 : \{nmb_2\}_{ks}$ |
| (2) $I \rightarrow B_2 : nma_3, \{B_2, A_3, ks\}_{kb2}$ | (7) $I \rightarrow A_3 : nmb_1, \{nma_3\}_{ks}$ |
| (3) $B_2 \rightarrow I : nmb_2, \{nma_3\}_{ks}$ | (8) $A_3 \rightarrow I : \{nmb_1\}_{ks}$ |
| (4) $I \rightarrow B_1 : nmb_2, \{B_1, A_3, ks\}_{kb1}$ | (9) $I \rightarrow B_1 : \{nmb_1\}_{ks}$ |
| (5) $B_1 \rightarrow I : nmb_1, \{nmb_2\}_{ks}$ | |

In messages (1 ÷ 3), A_3 and B_2 begin the authentication phase; the communications are possible because of the ticket in κ_0 . In messages (4 ÷ 5), I , playing the role of A_3 , uses B_1 for encrypting nmb_2 with ks . At this point, I can match the input data requested by B_2 and can subsequently, playing the role of B_2 , use A_3 as an encrypting oracle to obtain $\{nmb_1\}_{ks}$ which is needed to end the protocol run with B_1 . Hence, the intruder has been able to let B_1 believe he was interacting with A_3 while he was interacting with I , violating the authentication property.

Noteworthy, the attack is possible because there is a trace that start from a context where the join has assigned the same session keys for the two different tickets (the one in κ_0 and the other generated by A_3 in (1)). Observe that nothing prevents this neither in ψ_{KSL} nor in $\bar{\phi}_{KSL}$; therefore, we could repeat the verification by imposing this condition (that is indeed, required by the informal specification of KSL). Nevertheless, this is the hypothesis imposed in the analysis of KSL reported in [21] where the same attack has been firstly reported; this analysis is anyway motivated by considering the robustness of a protocol in presence of weaker assumptions (two tickets that contains the same session key) that are also realistic.

As a final attempt, we check whether enriching the intruder’s knowledge, KSL has new flaws. Let us iterate the verification algorithm with the initial knowledge

$$\bar{\kappa}_0 = \kappa_0 \cup \{\{B_2, A_3, sk_2\}_{tk_2}\}$$

that corresponds to the fact that the intruder has collected the ticket generated by B_2 for A_3 . Table 2 collects the results of the verification. First, observe that there is no difference in using κ_0 or $\bar{\kappa}_0$; the reason for this is that the extra message added to κ_0 is generated by the instance A in any case. Another aspect to remark is that, looking at the table in the case of 3 instances, it seems that $\bar{\phi}_{KSL}$ cuts off some attacks. However, by analysing the reported attacks it is possible to recognise that the extra attacks found with the trivial connection formula *true* are special cases of the attack presented previously. Indeed, in those attacks, the two instances of B use the same session key and the same key for encrypting the tickets (that is unrealistic). Moreover, the reported attacks basically correspond to “permutations” of the attack shown above, namely, they are the same attack where a different indexing of the instances is used.

We conclude by emphasising the advantage of using join and connection formulae; indeed, Table 1 and the last two rows of Table 2, show how the generated state space is dramatically reduced by exploiting a non trivial connection formula, while discovering the same set of attacks.²

5 Related work

We briefly relate our framework with some verification approaches (and their related tools) for security protocols based on model checking. The most important ones (up to our knowledge) are described in [22, 5, 36, 31, 24]. Our analysis will be more focused on methodological aspects rather than on efficiency issues, because different semantics have been exploited by different frameworks.

The approach in [22] has many similarities with our framework in modeling security protocols as open systems. There the openness is represented by a non-completely specified and extendible context. Principals are expressed in a dialect of the CCS calculus (equipped with cryptographic primitives) and properties are also given in a suitable logic. The main differences of our framework wrt [22] are represented by the open variables and the join primitive that, together with the connection formulae, can be seen as a coordination mechanism for open systems. Moreover we exploit symbolic techniques to shrink the state space.

In [5, 36] symbolic techniques for generating and analysing traces have been described. They are based on dialects of the π -calculus for principal representation while properties are stated as *correspondence assertions*; in [36] assertions are embedded in principal definitions, violating separation of concerns (changing the property to be checked leads to a re-formalisation of principal definitions). We separated more neatly the specification of principals from that of security

² The number of attacks are doubled with respect to the case of three instances because there are the same attacks where the two instances of A are swapped in the attacks.

Protocol	Number of states			Times		
	ASPASyA	TRUST	STA	ASPASyA	TRUST	STA
NS (2 instances)	55	328	24	0.7	0.06	0.07
KSL (2 instances)	39	135	33	0.8	0.04	0.04
KSL (4 instances)	21742	69875	-	43	1.8	-

Table 3. Comparing ASPASyA

properties. Both [5, 36] lack the possibility of template definition, hence every principal instance has to be specified by hand, which may be long and error prone, and impact on the formalisation of protocols and properties. For instance, many protocol assumptions depend on the initial knowledge and secrets sharing and must be explicitly stated in [5, 36]. For instance, we analysed the KSL protocol using TRUST and, in order to find the attack reported in Section 4, we had to explicitly state that the tickets must have the same session key, while the join mechanism of ASPASyA automatically generates and find the flawed context. Both [5, 36] offer the possibility to specify the initial knowledge of the intruder but without any parameterisation (as done in Section 4).

The approaches in [31, 24] are based on the *strand space* model introduced in [33, 34, 12]. Properties are expressed in terms of connections between strands of different kinds. A strand can be parameterised with variables and a trace is generated by finding a substitution for which an interaction graph exists. Principals are represented with terms of a free algebra whereas properties are specified by a suitable logic. Both approaches provide devices very similar to our join mechanism but is missing the possibility for the user to impose constraints on principal connections. Initial knowledge specification is given by adding data to the strand space, and can be fully parameterised with variables.

In [15] and [4] encryption/decryption primitives have been embedded into communication actions. Though the linguistic properties of the resulting calculi are very similar to those in cIP, our verification approach is different with respect to both [15] and [4]. Indeed, [15] introduces an event-based semantics where events are defined in terms of the enhanced communication; the semantics is then exploited to draw the relationships among Petri Nets, Strand Spaces and the inductive proof technique of [29, 28]. In [4], this enhanced synchronisation mechanism simplifies the static analysis of cryptographic protocols. The main difference wrt [15] and [4] lies in the verification techniques adopted, which are completely different in the three approaches. Indeed, embedding cryptographic primitive in the communication primitives allows us to define a symbolic semantics on the top of which our model checking algorithm works. This also allows us to avoid generating states that are considered not interesting (according to our working hypothesis). Regarding efficiency issues, the amount of time used by ASPASyA is comparable to those used by STA and TRUST (Table 3). ASPASyA is a bit slower than others because it consumes time in generating initial contexts and checking connection formulae. However, STA stops as soon as the first attack trace is found whereas TRUST and ASPASyA perform a search over the whole state space. TRUST generates the largest state space, mainly because it is based on a small step semantics. ASPASyA and STA have more

compact state spaces whose difference lies in the fact that $\mathcal{ASPASyA}$ initially applies the join mechanism.

6 Conclusions

We have addressed the problem of security protocol analysis taking inspiration from an approach oriented to a more general framework. We have proposed a verification methodology, and the $\mathcal{ASPASyA}$ tool which supports it, and we have presented the results of some practical experimentations.

The methodology tries to limit as much as possible the sources of errors in the formalisation process by keeping the different aspects of the formalisation into clearly separated steps. Importantly, and distinguishing from other approaches, the specification of the protocol and the property are clearly separate. Moreover, once the principal behaviours are given in the first step of the methodology, they remain unchanged. Several verification parameters can be finely tuned by the verifier, mostly in an intuitive way, like the search space by means of connection formulae in step two, and the power of the intruder in step three. Principal connections can be constrained by means of a \mathcal{PL} formula and the intruder power can be augmented by adding information to its initial knowledge, allowing for discovering attacks where the intruder exploits information about previous sessions of the protocol, and for testing the robustness of protocols under unexpected conditions.

The automatic phase of verification is performed at a cost comparable with similar state of the art tools, also thanks to mechanisms for the selective pruning of the state space. Experimentally, we have applied the methodology to the verification of several protocols, some of which have been illustrated in this paper, detecting all the known flaws (like the one recently reported in [4], found with techniques not based on model checking).

In order to enhance our methodology, we are planning to extend the framework to handle non atomic keys, hashing functions and time-marked names. Moreover, along the line of connection formulae, we believe that security properties can be exploited as heuristic strategies to “guide” the state exploration towards states that more likely make the property false.

Finally, we would like to extend the open variables and the constrained join mechanism, now based on connection formulae, to the more the general case of open system verification, where open variables represent resources, and the join is constrained by formulae aimed at guarantee more general composition properties, as we have initially investigated in [7].

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